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-Abstract- 
This paper addresses the impact information has on electoral accountability in a legislative system based 
on seniority using laboratory experiments. A purely rational choice perspective of a simple voting 
environment implies that information is inconsequential when seniority is exceptionally valuable. 
Seniority advantage presents the opportunity to shirk at the expense of voters. I contrast the rational 
choice perspective to behavioral considerations of trust, betrayal and expectations. Voter information 
about incumbent behavior is varied across experimental treatments, and I find that information leads to 
accountability when voters can compare their own incumbent’s behavior to the behavior of others. 
Moreover, information deters incumbent shirking.  
-word count: 7,000-  
JEL classification codes: C91, C92, D72, D89 
keywords: voting, experiments, information, seniority, principal-agent  
                                                          
∗ One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866; Telephone: (714) 516-4533; Email: 
cortneyrodet@gmail.com; Fax: (714)628-2881.  
 
 
2 
 
1. SENIORITY AND VOTER INFORMATION 
 Consider the principal-agent relationship between voters and elected officials. If an 
outcome observed by voters contains some element of randomness, thus deteriorating the 
incumbent’s performance signal, seniority acts to insure incumbents against bad outcomes and 
potentially leads to moral hazard.  Moreover, voters may disregard performance signals entirely 
if seniority is exceptionally valuable.  
 Seniority is a key indicator of an incumbent’s experience, connections and leadership 
roles (Weingast and Marshall 1988). Moreover, the distributive theory of politics suggests that 
voters overlook shirking behavior because of the incumbent’s ability to secure district specific 
benefits (Alvarez and Saving 1997; Arceneaux 2006; Gomez and Wilson 2001; Levitt and 
Snyder 1997; Stein and Bickers 1994). Sacking a senior incumbent is costly in terms of foregone 
experience, connections and power (Bernhardt, Dubey and Hughson 2004; Buchanan and 
Congleton 1994; Chari et al. 1997; Chen and Niou 2005; Dick and Lott 1993; Friedman and 
Wittman 1995; Knight 2002).  
 McKelvey and Riezman (1992) modeled the strategic implications of seniority where 
they showed that incumbents have the incentive to institute seniority to prevent turnover.1 In 
theory, recurring competitive elections and promises of long-term employment would solve the 
principal-agent problem, but using tenure as an allocation mechanism for political power (vis. 
benefits) encourages the voter to lower her performance standard. 
 A central element upon which electoral accountability hinges is information. The amount 
of information gathered depends on relative costs and benefits, and its type can range from a 
candidate’s party and platform to his experience and seniority. It is possible that shirking occurs 
because of the usual rational ignorance and collective action problems. Voters lack the incentive 
                                                          
1 See also Holcombe (1989) and Muthoo and Shepsle (2010). 
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to acquire and process information because of their infra-marginality and they lack incentive to 
act even if they are informed because personal costs are low relative to system wide costs. Most 
importantly, the boon of seniority may cause voters to forego information that is essential for 
accountability.  
Any principal-agent exchange implies some amount of trust on the part of the principal, 
yet standard rational choice theory fails to explain trust as well as the fulfillment of 
unenforceable contracts (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Camerer 2003 and references 
therein; Ostrom and Walker 2002). The vast literature in experimental economics serves as 
evidence of economists’ interest in discovering the roots of seemingly anomalous trusting and 
trustworthy behavior. In the context of this paper’s experimental design, the agent is trusted to 
redistribute resources to his principals despite the uncertainty of its efficiency and the cover it 
might provide for any shirking. We can think of the decision to reelect the agent as a signal of 
further trust as well as a retrospective reward for trustworthy behavior, thus if the principal 
considers that this trust has been betrayed the natural retribution is to vote to replace the 
incumbent agent. Humans are sensitive to the betrayal of expectations and trust and are willing to 
incur costs to exact retribution from the offender (Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 2000; Koehler 
and Gershocoff 2003). Moreover, subjects have been shown to react positively or negatively 
based on being treated fairly in distributive games, which in turn affects the behavior of 
proposers (Charness and Rabin 2002). 
There is also reason to believe that revealing information about their choices affects the 
behavior of elected officials. This impact has been well documented (Besley and Burgess 2002; 
Djankov, McLiesh, Nenova, and Shleifer 2003; Ferraz and Finan 2008; McMillan and Zoido 
2004; Stromberg 2004). For instance, Besley and Prat (2006) highlight the correlation between 
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information, high incumbent turnover and low corruption emphasizing that information to the 
electorate is an essential component of accountability.2  
While previous research has highlighted the consequences of seniority and information 
separately, this paper combines these elements to understand how they jointly affect the choices 
of political agents. Increasing information may lead to increasing accountability depending on 
voters’ expectations and trust; however, an overwhelming seniority advantage may deter voters 
from becoming informed. Laboratory experiments are used to understand this interaction in a 
principal-agent experiment where subjects act as candidates and voters. Experiments are useful 
because they allow for control over the amount of information voters can acquire as well as the 
degree to which incumbents’ decisions are shrouded by uncertainty.3 To study such an 
interaction with field data is difficult because a substantial seniority advantage may be the cause 
of rational ignorance. Different information treatments are implemented in a game where 
seniority is valuable to voters. Meanwhile, this value provides senior incumbents the opportunity 
to use their position to enrich themselves at the expense of voters. These treatments vary the 
amount, type and cost of information to examine its effects on incumbents’ decisions to shirk and 
voters’ decisions to become informed and to hold politicians accountable. Results indicate that 
voters predictably respond to the value of seniority, yet information has an effect on 
accountability when voters are able to compare the behavior of all incumbents. On the other 
hand, incumbents do not capitalize on their seniority advantage to the extent predicted, and their 
decisions to shirk are affected by the information treatments.   
 
2. THE ENVIRONMENT 
                                                          
2 For a review of the possible down side to supplying the principal full information see Prat (2005). 
3 Data collection might also be challenging due to incumbents’ efforts to hide their shirking from constituents. 
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The following section will describe the environment in which we will be working. The 
reader will see that the rational choice perspective of the environment implies that information 
should not matter at all to voters when seniority is fashioned to be exceptionally valuable. This is 
intentional as it provides an extremely strong test of information as an impetus for 
accountability.  
Suppose the environment lasts for 𝑇 periods.4 Incumbents make their decisions in the 
first stage. These include whether to tax voters and whether to shirk. In the second stage, voters 
decide the fate of incumbents. An incumbent who loses reelection is automatically replaced by a 
challenger, whose role is not modeled specifically but whose presence is integral to the game. 
Suppose there are an odd number of 𝐷 districts, each with 𝑁𝑑, 𝑑 = {1, … ,𝐷} voters and one 
incumbent. Voters receive an endowment, 𝐸, each period, which is taxable. The incumbent from 
each district is either senior or junior based on the variable 𝑒𝑑𝑡 that measures his tenure i.e. the 
number of times he has been reelected. That is,  
𝑠𝑑𝑡 = �𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑑𝑡 ≥  𝑒𝑚𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 �,     (1) 
where 𝑒𝑚 is the median tenure  among all incumbents. This simple rule means that 
𝐷+1
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incumbents are senior.5  
Incumbents determine whether voters are taxed by majority vote and seniority dictates 
how the tax revenue is distributed.6 For simplicity, I assume that if voters are taxed, their entire 
                                                          
4 A similar equilibrium is found using an infinitely repeated game, but the experiment is a finitely repeated version, 
which is why it is presented here. 
5 This is essentially the result in Muthoo and Shepsle where seniority is instituted endogenously in a legislative 
bargaining framework. 
6 The rule used here is reminiscent of the endogenous seniority rule found in Muthoo and Shepsle (2010) in a 
legislative bargaining context like that of Baron and Ferejohn (1989). 
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endowment is collected, aggregated and then redistributed. Redistribution is determined by the 
following rule, where 𝜎𝑑𝑡 is the district’s share of the tax benefits:  
𝜎𝑑𝑡 = �1𝑆 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡0 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑑𝑡 = 𝑗𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑜𝑟 � ,    (2) 
where 𝑆 is the subset of senior incumbents. Thus, voters whose incumbent is senior gain from the 
redistribution whereas voters whose incumbent is junior lose. Voters in a senior district split the 
share equally. 
The amount of the transfer a voter receives also depends on two key factors: nature and 
the shirking decision of the incumbent. Equation (3) below shows the voter’s period payoff 
function. The term 𝛼𝑡  is a random efficiency variable that affects the “quality” of the net transfer 
delivered to voters. It is uniformly random on the range [𝛼, 1] with mean 𝛼� = (1 + 𝛼)/2  and 
variance, 𝑣 = (1 − 𝛼)2/12. Each period a new 𝛼𝑡 is drawn that is unknown to incumbents; 
however, both voters and incumbents know the distribution from which 𝛼𝑡 is drawn. This opens 
the door for shirking behavior by senior incumbents. 
Senior incumbents decide how much of the transfer is delivered to their voters as they 
have the option to take some or all of the voters’ shares of the transfer. The share taken by the 
incumbent is represented by 𝑔𝑑𝑡 and is assumed to be equal for all voters in the district. The 
choice 𝑔𝑑𝑡 is bound from above by 
𝜎𝑑𝑡𝛱𝑡
𝑁𝑑
 , where 𝛱𝑡 =  𝜏𝑡 𝑁𝑑𝐷 i.e. is the aggregate tax revenue 
collected from all districts. The period payoff for a voter 𝑖  in district 𝑑 is: 
𝑈𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝐸 – 𝜏𝑡  +  𝛼𝑡 �𝜎𝑑𝑡𝛱𝑡𝑁𝑑   –  𝐼{𝑠𝑡}𝑔𝑑𝑡�.    (3) 
The function 𝐼{𝑠𝑡} equals 1 if the incumbent is senior. The period payoff for incumbent 𝑑 is: 
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𝑈𝑑𝑡 = 𝑊 +  𝐼{𝑠𝑡}𝑔𝑑𝑡 ∗ 𝑁𝑑.     (4) 
The term 𝑊 represents the incumbent wage and perquisites guaranteed while in office. It is 
assumed that incumbents who lose reelection join an existing pool of candidates, 𝐿 − 𝐷, earning 
a wage 𝑤 and can be elected again in the future. It is assumed that 𝑊 > 𝑤. The assumption that 
only senior incumbents choose 𝑔𝑑𝑡 is for simplicity and highlights the power in seniority.
7 
In the first stage of each period, the senior incumbents choose 𝑔𝑑𝑡 . In the second stage, 
voters choose whether to keep the incumbent or elect a challenger. The game is played under a 
condition of common knowledge such that incumbents and voters understand each other’s 
incentives. The tension in the environment is produced by the incentive for the incumbent to 
shirk and the uncertainty a voter experiences regarding what voters in other districts will do at 
the voting booth. This leads to the possible outcome where senior incumbents are shirking yet 
being reelected every period. The reader can find a short proof using weakly dominant, pure 
strategies in the appendix that explains the logic of zero turnover. 
Rational choice therefore implies that the only information relevant to voters in this 
environment is seniority. But there is reason to believe that the revelation of incumbents’ 
decisions will impact both voters’ and incumbents’ choices by attributing outcomes to the 
conscious decision of the agent. 
Revealing information to the voter means the voter is no longer dependent on her 
expectation regarding nature and expectations of trust in the incumbent. If she is fully rational, 
the voter will behave similarly to the receiver in the oft studied ultimatum game – any payoff 
greater than or equal to 𝜖 is acceptable, where 𝜖 is the minimum amount she can receive from the 
                                                          
7 This is a simplification and not an argument that junior incumbents cannot provide benefits to their districts. The 
same arguments apply when junior incumbents have some influence in the legislature, yet remain subordinate to 
senior members and leadership. 
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incumbent. However, this is not the regular result in ultimatum game experiments. If trust drives 
the principal’s decision calculus, we can infer that intentions matter as has been shown in other 
contexts involving trust and fairness (Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher 2008; McCabe, Rigdon and 
Smith 2003; Rigdon, McCabe and Smith 2007). A trusting voter will care whether her payoff 
was determined by nature or by the incumbent’s action. 
Consider how trust would affect the voter’s calculus. Suppose the voter is informed of 
𝑔𝑑𝑡 leaving no doubt whether the outcome was a product of nature or the decision of the 
incumbent. Common knowledge of incentives leads fully rational voters to form expectations 
about what their payoffs will be. As shown above, the rational expectation would be an amount 
𝑋 = 𝜖 based on the seniority advantage in the legislature; thus, receiving an amount 𝑋′ > 𝑋 = 𝜖 
would give reason to reelect the incumbent. On the other hand, if a trusting voter forms some 
expectation, 𝑋 > 𝜖, then receiving 𝑋′ < 𝑋 causes her to react negatively and she votes to elect 
the challenger. Rather than being satisfied with 𝑋′ > 𝜖, the betrayal of trust is a sufficiently 
strong motivator in her decision calculus. 
Consider further the possibility that the voter is informed about 𝑔𝑑𝑡 as well as 𝑔𝑑′𝑡 , 𝑑′ ≠
𝑑. In this environment, voters’ expectations may be affected not only by the voter’s own 
incumbent but by the behavior of other incumbents as well. In this case, voters have a common 
measuring stick by which to judge the incumbents (Besley and Case 1995). Once again, a fully 
rational voter’s expectation will be low (𝑋 = 𝜖) given the rules of the game, but she only 
compares her expected return to what the incumbent delivers. Knowing what other incumbents 
did is irrelevant. 
On the other hand, suppose a trusting voter has an expectation of 𝑋 > 𝜖. If all incumbents 
leave voters with an amount less than 𝑋, yet this particular voter’s incumbent shirked the least 
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(or was not guilty of shirking the most), the voter likely adjusts her expectation downward but 
rewards the incumbent with a vote for reelection. Otherwise, if the incumbent is guilty of 
shirking the most, the voter adjusts her expectation downward and votes to elect a challenger.  
 
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 I refer to subjects as either voters or candidates but context was not used in the 
experiment, which is verified by the instructions found in the appendix. The parameters such as 
pay rates were chosen to be consistent with a similar principal-agent experiment used in previous 
work (Author 2012). The number of groups and group sizes were chosen for various reasons 
including constrained lab size and research budget. The general set up was ten candidates and 
five districts with three voters each (𝐿 = 10,𝐷 = 5,  and 𝑁𝑑 = 3). Only five candidates were in 
office at one time and are referred to as incumbents, whereas the other five are referred to as 
challengers. Of the five incumbents in any period, the top three in terms of tenure were 
considered senior. It is important to note that the tenure rank of the incumbents was randomly 
determined to begin the experiment, but it was subsequently determined by the number of 
consecutive reelections. In total twenty-five subjects were needed per session.  
 Incumbents received a salary of 𝑊 = $0.60 each period, while challengers decoded text 
strings for 2.5 cents for every correct code. The decoding activity provided a way to keep 
subjects involved as well as a means to earning some money if the prediction of zero incumbent-
turnover held up.8 Voters received an endowment of 𝐸 = $0.45 each period, which was subject 
to taxation. Voters were taxed an amount equal to their endowment if the active incumbents 
passed the tax by a majority vote. Only voters in senior districts stood to receive a positive share 
                                                          
8 There was not a limit on how many codes a subject could be paid for; however, their time in each period was 
limited by how much time it took incumbents and voters to reach their decisions. 
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of the tax revenue and could receive as much as $0.75 in a single period. This means voters in 
junior districts were left with nothing if the tax passed.9 
 Recall that the efficiency aspect of the transfer. This feature captures the uncertainty of 
legislative promises as well as creates the opportunity for moral hazard. The efficiency variable 
𝛼𝑡 varied between [1/3, 1] each period. The lower bound of 1/3 was chosen so that the ex-ante 
expected value of the transfer to senior district voters was $0.50 such that senior district voters 
would prefer that the tax passed but would still allow senior incumbents to disguise their actions 
in the no-information treatment. The random draws of 𝛼𝑡were the same for each treatment and 
session. The incumbents did not know the value of 𝛼𝑡 when making their decisions, but all 
subjects knew the distribution from which it was drawn. 
Each session featured 20 paying periods. The first 5 functioned as practice where 
incumbents set taxes by simple majority rule. Groups were then randomized and the next 15 
periods allowed for shirking. Subjects were thoroughly instructed on the payoff structures and 
were told that the maximum amount an incumbent could take per voter was 75 cents whereas the 
minimum was zero. They were also made aware of the respective information rule. It is 
important to note that subjects had access to an on-screen calculator at the beginning of each 
period that allowed them to test different levels of efficiency as well as incumbent shirking 
before making their choices. The experimenter also walked them through arbitrary examples so 
they could gain proficiency using the calculator and understand its output. 
3.1 Treatments 
Each period of the experiment had two stages. In the first stage the incumbents made 
their choices and in the second stage voters decided whether to keep the incumbent based on the 
                                                          
9 Although these parameters appear to depart from reality at first blush, these were chosen to make the focal 
incentives salient to subjects. This is a benefit of experimental research. 
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information they were given. Stage 1 did not vary across treatments, but Stage 2 varied by the 
information voters received. While the strict rational choice prediction rules out information 
influencing voter decisions, behavioral considerations as to whether voters respond differently to 
outcomes of chance and outcomes of strategy are important. The information treatments are 
motivated by the model described in section 3. 
 No Information Treatment (NI): Incumbents in Stage 1 voted on the tax and each senior 
incumbent indicated how much of the voters’ transfers they would keep if the tax passed.10 In 
Stage 2 of this treatment voters only saw their payoffs. Incumbents saw their own payoffs, the 
value of 𝛼𝑡 and their voters’ payoffs. An election in each district determined whether the 
incumbent stayed in office or not. Results were announced and voters were informed of what the 
candidate’s seniority rank would be in the upcoming period, whether he or she was a returning 
incumbent or a newly elected challenger. 
 Full Information Treatment (FI): Voters in this treatment condition saw their 
incumbent’s tax vote, the value of 𝛼𝑡 and their payoffs. If the incumbent was senior, the voter 
also saw how much the transfer he or she awarded himself or herself. A vote then determined the 
fate of the incumbent. 
 Costly Information Treatment (CI): Here voters only saw their payoffs, but they had the 
option of paying $0.05 to reveal information to the group about the incumbent’s decisions and 
the efficiency variable.11  
                                                          
10 Readers have questioned the necessity for this stage because it is possible to arrive at Stage 2 by automatically 
distributing endowments according to the seniority rule. However, doing so would omit important elements of the 
investigation. First, Stage 1 makes economic outcomes dependent on the seniority of incumbents as well as their 
actions. Second, starting subjects with an endowment that is possibly taxed creates the effect of junior voters giving 
up what is theirs for the benefit of voters in other districts. 
11 All voters had the option of paying the fee to reveal information, even those with a period payoff of zero. The 
bankruptcy rule instituted guaranteed that subjects leave with at least their participation payment of $10. 
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 Relative Information Treatment (RI): This treatment condition differed from the Full 
Information case because voters in senior districts not only observed their own incumbent’s 
shirking but the shirking of all senior incumbents. Incumbents remained unaware of the shirking 
of others. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
We arrive at the predicted incumbent and voter behavior based on the strict rational 
choice characterization of the environment described above. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Senior incumbents will take the largest amount possible from voters’ transfers (75 
cents per voter). 
Hypothesis 2: Incumbents will always be reelected. The marginal voter cannot do any better by 
electing the challenger based on seniority rule. 
Hypothesis 3: No voter will pay to reveal information in the Costly Information Treatment. 
 
The FI treatment provides a direct comparison to the NI treatment where any variation in 
behavior can be linked to the ability to directly attribute outcomes to incumbents’ choices. The 
CI treatment provides a measure of the willingness of voters to use information in the context of 
seniority advantage when it is not gratis. This treatment makes sense from a public choice 
perspective because informing voters may undermine the ill effects of the seniority trap, but if 
the cost of information is prohibitive then the situation is hardly improved. The final hypothesis 
constitutes a true display of rational ignorance elucidated by Downs (1957) where voters free 
ride on others’ willingness to supply information. As he put it, “when benefits are indivisible, 
each individual is always motivated to evade his share of the cost of producing them.”  
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The RI treatment adds another wrinkle to the FI treatment that may affect a voter’s 
behavioral response by allowing them to compare their own incumbent’s behavior to that of 
others. The behavior of other incumbents will serve as a reference point for constructing 
expectations and guide the voters’ calculus in exacting retribution for betrayed trust (Koehler and 
Gershocoff 2003).  
It is also likely that any difference in voter behavior will cause a reaction in incumbent 
behavior because this is a repeated game. Furthermore, the information treatments could impact 
the incumbents’ behavior despite it being irrational. First, incumbents may expect retribution 
from offended voters and the monetary cost of losing reelection. Second, humans exhibit a desire 
for the good opinion of others as well as a good opinion of themselves. This explains why we 
observe trustworthy behavior even in situations where the trustor’s reaction is unknown and 
retribution is not possible (Dana, Weber and Kuang 2007; Pelligra 2010). 
 
4. RESULTS 
This section describes the results from eight sessions conducted at a large American 
public university. Subjects were recruited using the ORSEE online recruiting software (Greiner 
2004). Two sessions of each treatment were conducted using 25 subjects each, for 200 subjects 
in all. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 
2007). The average payment was around $18 including a $10 participation payment for an hour 
in the lab. Instructions were read aloud and subjects went through five periods of practice before 
the treatment began. The aggregate results will follow the order of the hypotheses, followed by 
analysis of individual voter choice. The amount taken from the voters’ transfers by the 
incumbents will be referred to as their “take.” First, note that voters were taxed virtually every 
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period of each treatment. The incumbents in the no-information (NI), full-information (FI), 
costly-information (CI) and relative information (RI) treatments passed the tax 100%, 97%, 
100% and 97% of the time respectively.  
 
4.1 Shirking 
Result 1: Senior incumbents do not maximize their take on average in any treatment. The 
treatments had no effect on the magnitude of incumbents’ take, but information did affect the 
frequency at which incumbents shirked. 
Table 1 displays the mean incumbent take conditional on redistribution occurring for 
each treatment where the last period is excluded from the analysis. The averages of each subject 
incumbent from each treatment are treated as independent observations. Right away, it is 
apparent that senior incumbents took well below the maximum of 75 cents per subject. There are 
no significant differences between treatments as is indicated by the p-values from Mann-Whitney 
tests. Note that one-sided tests were conducted when comparing treatment conditions to the 
baseline NI treatment because we wanted to see if increased information would lead to less 
shirking. When there is not a clear directional comparison between treatments, such as when 
comparing the FI and RI treatments, a two-sided test was conducted. 
Analysis of the frequency of taking a positive amount (out of a possible fourteen rounds) 
indicates significant differences between treatments. Specifically, incumbents shirked 
significantly less often in the FI treatment compared to the CI treatment. Likewise, the frequency 
is lower in the RI treatment compared to the NI and CI treatments. Therefore, although the 
magnitude of shirking is not affected by information, the rate at which incumbents took from 
voters is lower when voters are more informed.  
15 
 
 
4.2 Reelection 
Result 2: Senior incumbents who do not shirk are reelected nearly 100% of the time in all 
treatments and shirking senior incumbents are reelected at extremely high rates; however, 
shirking senior incumbents were reelected at a significantly lower rate than non-shirking 
incumbents in the RI treatment. Likewise, incumbents in the RI treatment are significantly less 
likely to be reelected as shirking increases based on predicted probabilities. There is no 
difference between treatments in the average reelection rates of shirking incumbents.  
 
Result 4: Voters who were informed of the conduct of their own incumbent as well as the other 
senior incumbents (RI treatment) were significantly more likely to reward a non-shirking 
incumbent with a vote for reelection. More importantly, they were significantly less likely to vote 
for a shirking incumbent, especially as the magnitude of shirking increased. Thus, information 
regarding the relative conduct of the legislature as a whole was primary to encouraging 
electoral accountability.  
Table 2 shows the mean reelection rates of incumbent by treatment using the district 
averages as independent observations. Once again, I exclude the last period from analysis. 
Results are separated by seniority and whether a senior incumbent shirked or not. In general, 
there was some turnover in each treatment, but the reelection rates were high (NI: 84%, FI: 89%, 
CI: 96%, RI: 87% when the incumbent shirked). Looking at the reelection rates of shirking 
senior incumbents tells us that voters recognized the value of seniority. Based on the behavioral 
arguments presented we expected that reelection rates would be relatively higher in the NI 
treatment where voters could only guess whether it was nature or the incumbent who reduced 
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their payoffs. In fact, the reelection rate falls below 100% in only two periods of the NI 
treatment; however, in aggregate the differences between treatments are not significant at the 5% 
level when the senior incumbent shirked. (Between treatment Mann-Whitney p-values for 
Take>0: (one-sided) NI-FI: 0.78; NI-CI: 0.10; NI-RI: 0.45; FI-CI: 0.73; CI-RI: 0.06; (two sided) 
FI-RI: 0.43) 
 Within-treatment differences are not significant for the NI, FI and CI treatments (Within 
treatment Mann-Whitney p-values: (one-sided) NI: 0.06; FI: 0.11; CI: 0.21). However, the 
difference is significant for the RI treatment (p-value: 0.01) implying that relative information is 
critical for electoral accountability.   
Figure 1 displays the kernel density estimation of the probability of reelection as a 
function of shirking measured as cents taken per voter. The data include all sessions and 
treatments to allow for more variation in the amount taken. The probability maximizing amount 
was $0.41, but for all practical purposes incumbents were almost guaranteed reelection if they 
took $0.45 per voter or less. Expected utility estimates suggest that the expected utility 
maximizing level of taking was in fact $0.75 per voter.12 The average amount taken in every 
treatment was well below this, meaning that incumbents could have shirked to a much greater 
degree. Combining this with the reelection results indicate that it was the threat of losing 
reelection that restrained incumbents and not the voters’ actual reactions to shirking. This is 
consistent with the classic result in Barro (1973) where the magnitude of the opportunity cost of 
losing reelection incentivizes politicians to not shirk. 
Let us turn to two sets of predicted probabilities based on regression analyses. The first 
set is based on district level election outcomes. The standard errors are clustered at the district 
                                                          
12 Let x be the amount taken per voter. The expected utility was estimated as 3x+px(0.60) where px is the probability 
of reelection when taking x. There are three voters per district and the salary for incumbents was $0.60. 
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level and controls include period, session and group indicators. The second set is based on 
individual voter choices regarding the reelection of a senior incumbent. The respective standard 
errors are clustered at the individual level and the controls variables are similar. The estimated 
logit model of reelection is found in (5). The voter choice model is similar, with the addition of 
the independent variable capturing a voter’s payoff, so it is withheld. A fuller description of the 
estimated models as well as a table including marginal effects and robust standard errors can be 
found in the appendix. 
𝑟𝑖𝑑𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 +  𝛽4𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑑𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝛾𝑇 + 𝑢𝑑𝑡          (5)  
The model features the election outcome as the dependent variable at the district level 
and controls for the incumbent’s shirking this period and last period, the efficiency of the transfer 
this period, and the incumbent’s tenure.  The vector 𝑇 captures the binary treatment variables and 
their interaction with the incumbents shirking. 
Figure 2 features the predicted reelection probabilities for senior incumbents as a function 
of their shirking. The FI, CI and RI treatments are each compared to the NI treatment in each of 
the respective panels. The solid line in each panel is the regression line fitted to the predicted 
probabilities whereas the dashed line is the NI treatment baseline. The grey area surrounding 
each regression line indicates the 95% confidence interval. Results indicate that as shirking 
increases, incumbents in the RI treatment are significantly less likely to be rewarded with 
reelection. There is no difference when comparing the FI and NI treatments. The predicted 
probability of reelection in the CI treatment is significantly greater than the baseline even as the 
amount taken from voters increases. Despite having access to costly information, voters in this 
treatment were marginally more informed about incumbents’ choices because very few voters 
purchased information, therefore explaining this difference is a challenge.  
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Figure 3 features the predicted probability of voting to reelect the incumbent as a function 
of his or her shirking. The results at the individual level reflect those at the district level. There is 
little to say about the comparison of the FI treatment to the baseline. There is only a small and 
significant difference at small amounts of taking in the FI treatment (the natural log of the 
median amount of $0.05 is 1.61).  
The bottom panel of Figure 3 confirms the key result from the RI treatment where we can 
see a clear difference in voting for the incumbent who takes increasingly large amounts from 
voters. At the maximum possible value of $0.75 per voter (log(75) = 4.32), there was a 75% 
chance on average that a subject in the NI treatment would vote for the incumbent. This number 
is barely 50% in the RI treatment.  
 
4.3 Costly Information 
Result 3: Voters use full and relative information when it is given to them (RI treatment), but they 
seldom pay to reveal information (CI treatment). 
Subjects infrequently paid to reveal information as was predicted. The mode occurs at 
zero whereas the average is 1.4 times per subject in the CI treatment. Eleven of the 18 subjects 
that did pay to reveal information did so only once. A voter was significantly more likely to pay 
for information following a negative change in payoff. A decrease of $0.10 from one period to 
the next increased the likelihood a voter purchased information by 3% (p-value 0.00) when 
controlling for period and incumbent rank. This is consistent with experimental work by Collier 
et al. (1989) investigating rational ignorance, but it is not economically significant. The take 
away is that seniority can have an overpowering effect on voters’ decisions to become informed. 
If information is a necessary impetus for accountability, we see that discouraging voters from 
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becoming informed is another way in which seniority buffers incumbents’ behavior from 
scrutiny. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 This paper addresses electoral accountability and the impact information when seniority 
is valuable. This research combines these elements using experimental treatments to vary voter 
information about incumbent choices to determine the impact on accountability. 
 Results indicate that information helped overcome the principal-agent problem by 
discouraging incumbent shirking. Incumbents were less likely to shirk when full information 
about the incumbent’s choice was given to voters (FI and RI treatments). Making information 
available at a cost did nothing to discourage incumbent shirking.  
Voters responded to seniority advantage. Senior incumbents who shirked were almost 
always reelected; however, providing voters with relative information about incumbent behavior 
significantly lowered the tolerance for a shirking incumbent. Incumbents were significantly less 
likely to be reelected as shirking increased based on predicted reelection probabilities. Analysis 
at the individual level revealed that the average voter in the RI treatment was significantly less 
likely to vote for a shirking incumbent. Furthermore, results indicate that seniority advantage 
entrenches voters in rational ignorance by discouraging them from acquiring costly information. 
Thus, revealing just an incumbent’s behavior to voters is not sufficient to provoke voters 
in this context. Instead, when the behavior of all incumbents is revealed, the elements of trust 
and expectations of fair treatment encourage accountability even when it is costly. The average 
wait for seniority (i.e. a recently elected junior challenger moving up to senior status) after 
kicking a shirking senior incumbent out of office was 4.56 periods (n=18; st.dev. 3.55) with the 
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maximum being eleven and the minimum being one period. This means that the voters gave up 
approximately $1.87 on average when electing a challenger over a senior incumbent.13 If we take 
nine cents per period as the average loss per voter in a senior district, where the ex-ante expected 
payoff is fifty-cents per period (75 × 2/3) and the ex-post expected payoff is forty-one cents 
period ((75-13.56) × 2/3),  voters lost only $0.41 on average over those 4.56 periods by keeping 
the incumbent. 
 From a policy perspective, improving information access to voters is more important for 
affecting incumbent behavior than for motivating voters. The dearth of shirking is perhaps 
striking considering the environment as well as the concerns of political scientists and public 
choice scholars. The behavior of incumbents in this experiment is possibly explained by trust-
responsiveness where trusting behavior engenders a trustworthy response on the part of the agent 
even in the face of large opportunity costs (Guerra and Zizzo 2004; Pelligra 2010). Future 
research could link this concept to actual behavior of elected officials. For instance, an actual 
legislator who participates in patronage may not feel he is violating his constituents’ trust if he is 
providing sufficiently large benefits along other policy or spending dimensions. Likewise, he can 
psychologically and publicly defend his decisions as being good for the group, as is often done 
when elected officials are on fact finding trips to Italy or improving roads near their property in 
their hometown (see Fallis, Higham, and Kindy 2012; Higham, Kindy and Fallis 2012).  
What then would mitigate the power of seniority in the legislature? Information is an 
important influence on senior incumbents in this context. Term limits have been proposed as a 
                                                          
13 These totals were calculated using the average amount taken by incumbents across all treatments (13.56 cents) and 
the expected transfer efficiency (2/3) and the average number of periods of seniority given up. So voters that 
achieved seniority a second time lost on average (75-13.56) × (2/3) × (4.56) = $1.87. The voters who kicked a senior 
incumbent out of office and never achieved seniority status again averaged 6.5 periods (n=8; st.dev. 3.66) between 
the election of a junior challenger and the end of the game. These voters gave up (75-13.56) × (2/3) × (6.5) = $2.66 
on average. 
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way to mitigate the incentives created by seniority; however, a related paper experimentally tests 
such an institution and the collective nature of the decision mitigates its effectiveness. On 
average, voters seemed to perceive that term limits reduced the cost of replacing an incumbent 
with seniority power, but re-election rates were not affected (Author 2012). Therefore, the 
mollification of seniority’s influence ought to be a topic of further research. 
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Table 1: Average Take  
Treatment Average Take Mann-Whitney P-value Freq. Take > 0 
Mann-Whitney 
P-Value 
NI 
14.59 
(6.08) 
N=9 
NI – FI: 0.40a 
NI – CI: 0.57a 
NI – RI: 0.56a 
8.56 
(2.12) 
N=9 
NI – FI: 0.14a 
NI – CI: 0.30a 
NI – RI: 0.04a 
FI 
11.77 
(5.41) 
N=10 
FI – CI: 0.31a 
FI – RI: 0.56b 
5.4 
(1.71) 
N=10 
FI – CI: 0.04a 
FI – RI: 0.63b 
CI 
15.05 
(6.93) 
N=7 
CI – RI: 0.52a 
10.57 
(2.11) 
N=7 
CI – RI: 0.01a 
RI 
15.64 
(5.19) 
N=15 
 
4.53 
(1.16) 
N=15 
 
Subject incumbent averages used as independent observations. a: One-sided test b: Two-sided 
test 
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Table 2: Reelection rates at the district level 
Treatment Senior, Take > 0 Senior, Take = 0 Junior 
NI 
0.84 
(0.07) 
N=7 
1.00 
. 
N=2 
0.51 
(0.16) 
N=6 
FI 
0.89 
(0.06) 
N=9 
0.98 
(0.02) 
N=7 
0.55 
(0.14) 
N=8 
CI 
0.96 
(0.03) 
N=7 
1.00 
. 
N=2 
0.64 
(0.11) 
N=5 
RI 
0.87 
(0.04) 
N=9 
1.00 
. 
N=6 
0.63 
(0.12) 
N=9 
District averages used as independent observations. Between treatment Mann-Whitney p-values 
for Take>0 : (one-sided) NI-FI: 0.78; NI-CI: 0.10; NI-RI: 0.45; FI-CI: 0.73; CI-RI: 0.06; (two 
sided) FI-RI: 0.43. Within treatment Mann-Whitney p-values: (one-sided) NI: 0.06; FI: 0.11; CI: 
0.21; RI: 0.01. 
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Fig. 1 Expected probability of reelection as a function of shirking 
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Fig. 2 Predicted probabilities of winning reelection by treatment. The solid lines are the 
regression lines from the respective treatments. The dashed line is the regression line from the 
predicted probabilities in the baseline NI treatment. The gray area around the regression lines 
indicates the 95% confidence intervals. 
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Fig. 3 Predicted probabilities of voting for the incumbent by treatment. The solid lines are the 
regression lines from the respective treatments. The dashed line is the regression line from the 
predicted probabilities in the baseline NI treatment. The gray area around the regression lines 
indicates the 95% confidence intervals. 
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